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Bit retrieval, the problem of determining a binary sequence from its cyclic auto-
correlation, is a special case of the phase retrieval problem. Algorithms for phase
retrieval are extensively used in several scientific disciplines, and yet, very little is
known about the complexity of these algorithms or phase retrieval in general. Here
we show that bit retrieval, in particular, is closely related to computations that arise
in algebraic number theory and can also be formulated as an integer program. We
find that general purpose algorithms from these fields, when applied to bit retrieval,
are outperformed by a particular iterative phase retrieval algorithm. This algorithm
still has exponential complexity and motivates us to propose a new public key sig-
nature scheme based on the intractability of bit retrieval, and image watermarking
as a possible application.
Keywords: phase retrieval, lattice basis reduction, LLL algorithm, subset sum problem, vector quantization,
cyclic difference set, public-key cryptosystem, digital signature
1 Introduction
Phase retrieval is the general problem of reconstructing a finitely sampled signal (or density in higher
dimensions) from its autocorrelation. Since knowledge of the autocorrelation is equivalent to knowledge of
the signal’s Fourier transform modulus, phase retrieval is fundamentally underdetermined without additional
information to constrain the Fourier transform phases. These constraints usually take the form of a priori
information: the signal may be known to have a particular support or distribution of values. Bit retrieval
is perhaps the simplest instance of phase retrieval, where the signal is periodic and known to take only
two values. Choosing without loss of generality these values to be 0 and 1, bit retrieval seeks to find a
binary sequence having a prescribed cyclic autocorrelation. For example, given the autocorrelation sequence
α = [5, 2, 1, 3, 3, 2, 3, 3, 1, 2], one solution is the binary sequence β = [1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1].
The computational complexity of bit retrieval is largely unexplored. Zwick et al. [Zw] made the first study
and were able to solve sequences up to lengths N = 64. There is a close relationship between bit retrieval
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and the problem of factoring in rings of algebraic integers, specifically, the integers of the cyclotomic field
of N th roots of unity. It is also possible to formulate bit retrieval as an integer program. While both of
these subjects, algebraic number theory and integer programming, have experienced significant algorithm
development in recent years, the fastest known bit retrieval algorithm still follows the principles devel-
oped in the study of phase retrieval. As described below, this algorithm has an empirically determined
average-case complexity of 2cN , with c ≈ 0.22. A point of comparison is the fact that an ordinary inte-
ger with two large factors of order 2N can be factored with subexponential time complexity, specifically,
exp [(logN)1/3(c log logN)2/3], where c = 8/3 [LL]. The latter problem is still considered intractable and
forms the basis of public key cryptosystems [RSA]. Can the apparent intractability of bit retrieval be ex-
ploited likewise? This paper reports on a public key signature scheme as a partial response to this challenge.
An application that appears to be well suited to this scheme is image watermarking.
2 Notation and terminology
We restrict our study to sequences of length N , where N is an odd prime, typically greater than 200 in
the applications we propose. The autocorrelation of sequences of real numbers, and more generally their
convolution product, corresponds to the standard product in the polynomial ring R[x]. Cyclic convolutions
correspond to the quotient ring R := R[x]/〈xN − 1〉, and cyclic integer sequences form the subring Z :=
Z[x]/〈xN − 1〉. Also of interest are the quotient rings R/〈ΦN 〉 and O := Z/〈ΦN 〉, where ΦN (x) :=
xN−1 + · · · + x + 1 is the N th cyclotomic polynomial. Since ΦN (x) is the irreducible polynomial of
ζ := exp (i2π/N), O is isomorphic to Z[ζ], the ring of integers of the cyclotomic field of N th roots of
unity. We denote both quotient maps by the symbol Ψ. The rational integers are the subring Z ⊂ O.
In computations, elements of the rings R, Z and O are represented by their components with respect to a
standard basis. We will use the following choice of basis elements:
R,Z : 1, x, . . . , xN−1 (1)
O : ζ, . . . , ζN−1 (2)
The ith component of an element α ∈ R is denoted [α]i, where α =
∑N−1
i=0 [α]ix
i
, and similarly for elements
of Z and O.
Our bases also allow us to define the binary elements. We say βR ∈ R is binary if [βR]i = ±12 for all
0 ≤ i ≤ N − 1 and Ψ(βR) 6= 0. This embedding is geometrically more natural than that given in the
introduction. There are exactly 2N − 2 binary elements in R and each has a distinct binary counterpart
βO = Ψ(βR) in O:
[βO]i =


[βR]i +
1
2 if [βR]0 < 0
[βR]i − 12 if [βR]0 > 0.
1 ≤ i ≤ N − 1 (3)
The automorphisms ofO are given by theN−1 conjugate maps defined by σj(ζ) := ζj , with 1 ≤ j ≤ N − 1.
The collection of these maps is closely related to the Fourier transform. Referring the action of σj on α ∈ O
to the basis (2),
σj(α) =
N−1∑
k=1
ζj k[α]k , (4)
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we see that σ := [σ1, . . . , σN−1] can be interpreted as a linear map O → CN−1. Since
∑N−1
i=0 ζ
j i = 0
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ N − 1, σ is also well defined when applied to elements of R and Z . We thus use
the same notation for the set of Fourier transform components for all three rings. The statement that the
automorphisms preserve multiplication in O, σj(αβ) = σj(α)σj(β), when written in multicomponent form
as σ(αβ) = σ(α)σ(β), is the “convolution theorem” of the Fourier transform. The latter, in combination
with the inverse Fourier transform (see below), is the basis of anO(N logN) multiplication algorithm (FFT)
in R, Z and O.
The map σN−1 corresponds to complex conjugation and will be denoted by the overbar in O as well as
C: σ(α) = σ(α). This extends by (4) to an action on elements of R and Z given by [α]j = [α]N−j , for
1 ≤ j ≤ N − 1, and [α]0 = [α]0.
The conventional Fourier transform also includes the zero-frequency component σ0 : R→ R, where
σ0(α) :=
N−1∑
i=0
[α]i (5)
is again to be interpreted as a linear map that extends in the obvious way to elements of Z . Linear trans-
formations σ−1 and σ−10 , corresponding to the inverse Fourier transform, are defined in the sense of the
Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse:
σ−1 := σ† · (σ · σ†)−1 = 1
N
σ† (6)
σ−10 := σ
†
0 · (σ0 · σ†0)−1 =
1
N
σ†0 , (7)
where · denotes matrix multiplication and † is the matrix adjoint. Whereas σ · σ−1 and σ0 · σ−10 are respec-
tively (N − 1)× (N − 1) and 1× 1 identity matrices, the product
π0 := σ
−1
0 · σ0 =
1
N


1 · · · 1
.
.
.
.
.
.
1 · · · 1

 (8)
is the projector to the ideal 〈ΦN 〉 in R. Similarly, σ−1 · σ is the projector onto the orthogonal complement,
R⊥, where orthogonality is with respect to the Euclidean norm:
‖α‖ := (σ0(α)2 + σ(α) · σ(α)) /N (9)
= αt · π0 · α+ αt · (1− π0) · α (10)
= αt · α . (11)
The Euclidean norm for elements α ∈ R⊥,
‖α‖⊥ := σ(α) · σ(α)/N , (12)
is also the appropriate norm in the quotients R/〈ΦN 〉 and O. Some of the interest in studying binary
elements derives from the fact that all binary β ∈ R have the same Euclidean norm, ‖β‖ = N/4.
The autocorrelation α of an element β ∈ R,Z,O is given by α = ββ and has real, nonnegative Fourier
transform components: σ(ββ) = σ(β)σ(β), and also σ0(β β) = σ0(β)2 for β ∈ R,Z . The autocorrelation
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of an element β is therefore equivalent to the information in its Fourier transform modulus, and recovering
β from its autocorrelation corresponds to “retrieving its phases”. Autocorrelations, and more generally,
elements with the property α = α, form the real subrings Rˆ, Zˆ and Oˆ. If βO ∈ O is binary and βR is its
binary counterpart in R, then the corresponding autocorrelations αO = βOβO and αR = βRβR are related
by
[αR]0 =
N
4
[αR]i = [αO]i +
N
4
, 1 ≤ i ≤ N − 1 .
(13)
A binary element β ∈ O is said to be perfect if its autocorrelation is a rational integer, that is, ββ ∈ Z. The
Fourier transform components of a perfect β have constant modulus, since ββ = σj(ββ) = |[σ(β)]j |2. For
any N , β = 1 is perfect; a less trivial example, for N = 3, is the binary element β = 1 + ζ .
The norm N (α) ∈ Z of an element α ∈ O is defined by
N (α) :=
N−1∏
j=1
σj(α) =
(N−1)/2∏
j=1
|σ(α)j |2 , (14)
and has the interpretation of the index in O of the principal ideal αO.
3 Bit retrieval
A generalization of the problem posed in the introduction is the following:
B1: Given α ∈ O and the knowledge that α = β1 β2 where β1 and β2 are binary, find a
particular such pair β1 and β2.
The security of the proposed signature scheme relies on the intractability of two related problems:
B2: Given α ∈ Oˆ and the knowledge α = ββ where β is binary, find such a β.
B3: Given a finite set A ⊂ O and the knowledge that some binary element β ∈ O divides every
α ∈ A, find such a β.
In the ring of rational integers these problems correspond to factorization (B1), finding the square root of a
perfect square (B2), and obtaining the GCD of a set of integers (B3). Of these, only factorization remains
intractable, the square root and GCD being computed efficiently by Newton’s and Euclid’s algorithms re-
spectively. The failure of unique factorization in O, already for N ≥ 23 [MM], implies that a Euclidean
algorithm is not available for efficiently solving B3 in these rings. Although B2 and B3 are clearly easier
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than B1, what makes the ring O attractive is that even the former problems appear to be intractable when
the size of the problem corresponds to N , rather than the sizes of the rational integers in the specification
(coefficients in the standard basis). It is also for this reason that we restrict the unknown factors or “square
roots” to be binary.
Clearly problem B2 becomes easy when the density of 0’s in the binary element β is either very large or very
small. Rankenburg [R] shows that the symmetric case β = β also represents an easy instance of B2. For
symmetric β the unknown phases are either 0 or π, and in particular, one of the following equations holds:
σ1(β) = ±
√
σ1(α). Solving either equation for the set of unknown binary components of β is equivalent to
solving subset-sum problems of arbitrarily low density (see section 4.1), and methods based on lattice basis
reduction [LO] provide a polynomial-time algorithm.
While the algebraic statements of the bit retrieval problems above seem natural, the most efficient known
algorithm for solving B2, in particular, is entirely non-algebraic. For this algorithm (section 4.3), as well
as integer programming methods (section 4.2), what matters is the following formulation as a geometric
feasibility problem in the ring R. We recall that autocorrelations of corresponding binary elements in the
rings O and R are simply related by (13).
Consider two subsets of R: the hypercube
B :=
{
β ∈ R : [β]i = ±1
2
, 0 ≤ i ≤ N − 1
}
, (15)
and for any α ∈ Rˆ, the set
Tα := {β ∈ R : ββ = α} . (16)
The restatement of B2 as a feasibility problem is then:
B′2: Given α ∈ Rˆ, known to be the autocorrelation of a binary element, find B ∩ Tα.
When characterized by its Fourier transform, the set Tα is recognized as a pair of (N − 1)/2 dimensional
tori. Let β ∈ Tα, then the definition (16) implies
σ0(β) = ±
√
σ0(α)
|σj(β)| =
√
σj(α) , 1 ≤ j ≤ (N − 1)/2 ,
(17)
with no further constraints required on the remaining components because of complex conjugation symme-
try. Using the linearity of the Fourier transform it is straightforward to show that the convex hull of Tα is
given by
h(Tα) :=
{
β ∈ R : |σi(β)| ≤
√
σi(α), 0 ≤ i ≤ (N − 1)/2
}
. (18)
Since convex relaxations of constraints typically simplifies feasibility problems, we also consider the convex
hull of the hypercube,
h(B) :=
{
β ∈ R : |[β]i| ≤ 1
2
, 0 ≤ i ≤ N − 1
}
. (19)
The convex relaxations that apply to problem B′2 are summarized in the following:
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Theorem 3.1. Let α ∈ Rˆ be the autocorrelation of a binary element; then
B ∩ Tα = h(B) ∩ Tα = B ∩ h(Tα) (20)
Proof. The equality of these sets follows from the observation that if β ∈ h(B) then ‖β‖ ≤ N/4 and
equality requires β ∈ B. Similary, if τ ∈ h(Tα), then
N−1∑
i=0
|σi(τ)|2 ≤
N−1∑
i=0
σi(α) =
N−1∑
i=0
|σi(β)|2 , (21)
where β is some binary element. Thus ‖τ‖ ≤ ‖β‖ = N/4 and equality implies τ ∈ Tα. Now suppose
γ ∈ h(B) ∩ Tα; then since γ ∈ Tα we know ‖γ‖ = N/4. On the other hand, since γ ∈ h(B), this norm is
possible only if in fact γ ∈ B. The same argument shows that B ∩ h(Tα) = B ∩ Tα.
3.1 Uniqueness in bit retrieval
For the digital signature scheme considered in section 5, which derives its security from the conjectured
intractability of bit retrieval, there is no requirement that the solutions to any of problems B1, B2, or B3
be unique. As described in more detail in section 6, this scheme only requires, more generally, that it is
difficult to find any solution with small Euclidean norm. It is interesting nevertheless, to ask what varieties
of non-uniqueness can occur in bit retrieval. Our remarks here will address problem B2.
Clearly if β ∈ O solves B2 then so does β. This together with the statement expressed in the following
lemma characterizes the symmetries inherent in bit retrieval.
Lemma 3.2. If β ∈ O and βγ ∈ O are two solutions of an instance of B2, then γ = ±ζk for some k.
Proof. Since both solutions must have the same autocorrelation, γγ = 1. This implies (N (γ))2 = 1 and we
infer that γ is a unit. Kummer’s lemma can now be used to rewrite the autocorrelation of γ with the result
γ2 = ζk for some k. This shows that γ is a 2N -th root of unity, as asserted.
Beyond the symmetries that apply to any solution, problem instances can suffer from special forms of non-
uniqueness. One of these has a counterpart in crystallographic phase retrieval [PS] and applies when a
solution is a product β = β1β2, and neither factor is of the form ±ζk. It may then happen that β′ = β1β2
is also binary and not related to β by one of the symmetries discussed above. Since β′ has the same auto-
correlation as β, it also solves B2. An example of this mechanism for N = 13 arises for the autocorrelation
ββ = 3. From the factors β1 = 1 + ζ2 + ζ7 and β2 = 1 + ζ3 + ζ4 one obtains β = −ζ − ζ8 − ζ9 − ζ12
and β′ = −ζ − ζ5 − ζ6 − ζ8 as the two binary solutions. Instances with non-unique solutions, such as this
one, become very rare as N increases. In a set of experiments with 23 ≤ N ≤ 53, random binary β were
drawn from the uniform distribution using a pseudo-random number generator. When the autocorrelation of
β was given to the difference map algorithm (see below), the solution β′ was compared with β. The fraction
of solutions β′ not symmetry-related to β was found to decrease rapidly with N , as shown in Table 1.
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N = 23 29 31 37 41 43 47 53
0.044 0.024 0.019 6.1× 10−3 2.4× 10−3 1.4× 10−3 4.7× 10−4 1.5× 10−4
Table 1: Probability of non-uniqueness in bit retrieval
3.2 Facts concerning the norm
WithN fixed, what characterizes hard instances of bit retrieval? The normN (β) of the secret binary element
β ∈ O is a natural candidate and in fact establishes a connection with the subject of cyclic difference sets.
Theorem 3.3. Let β ∈ O be binary, then N (β) ≤ (N+14 )
N−1
2 and equality holds only if β is perfect.
Proof. Let βR be the binary counterpart in R of a binary element β ∈ O (see (3)); then [βR]i = ±12 for
0 ≤ i ≤ N−1. Let µj := |[σ(β)]j |2 = |[σ(βR)]j |2 denote the squares of the corresponding Fourier moduli.
Using expressions (9, 11) for the Euclidean norm and (14) for the algebraic norm, we have:
σ0(βR)
2 +
N−1∑
j=1
µj = N βR · βR = N
2
4
, (22)
N−1∏
j=1
µj = N (β)2 . (23)
Applying the arithmetic-geometric mean inequality to the numbers µj we obtain:
N (β) ≤
[
1
N − 1
(
N2
4
− σ0(βR)2
)]N−1
2
. (24)
Since βR has an odd number of ±12 components, σ0(βR)2 ≥ 14 and the stated bound on N (β) follows.
Equality of the arithmetic and geometric means requires that the (squared) Fourier moduli µj are equal, and
this is one way of characterizing a perfect β.
We will refer to binary elements that achieve the upper bound in theorem 3.3 as Hadamard because of
their direct relationship to Hadamard cyclic difference sets. More generally [Ba], a cyclic difference set
can be defined in terms of the cyclic group G of order N acting on binary elements β ∈ R with generator
g : β 7→ xβ. Defining a subset of G by D := {gi : [β]i > 0, 0 ≤ i ≤ N − 1}, we can ask if it is possible
for every nonidentity element of G to appear exactly λ times in the set {d1d2−1 : d1, d2 ∈ D}. If this is the
case, and the cardinality of D is k, then
(N − 1)λ + k = k2 , (25)
and D is declared a cyclic difference set with parameters (N, k, λ). The binary β which defines such a
difference set will then satsify (β + 12ΦN)(β +
1
2ΦN ) = [k, λ, λ, . . . , λ], that is, β will be perfect since
Ψ(ββ) = k − λ (a rational integer). A Hadamard cyclic difference set maximizes k − λ to the maximum
value consistent with the norm bound from theorem 3.3:
k − λ = N + 1
4
. (26)
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From (25) and (26) one obtains the Hadamard cyclic difference set parameters (N, N−12 , N−34 ), which evi-
dently require that N ≡ 3 mod 4.
There is a simple construction of Hadamard cyclic difference sets for any prime N of the form 4m+3 [Ba];
the formula for the corresponding binary β ∈ O is given by:
[β]i =
1− (i|N)
2
(1 ≤ i ≤ N − 1) , (27)
where the Legendre symbol (i|N) equals 1 whenever i is a square in the finite field of order N , and −1
otherwise. For certain special values of N , such as N = 2m − 1 and N = 4m2 + 27, other constructions
of Hadamard cyclic difference sets are known [Ba]. An example of a Hadamard integer for N = 7 is
β = 1 + ζ2 + ζ3.
The norms of “random” binary integers are typically significantly smaller than the norm of a Hadamard
integer. This is made precise in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.4. Let β ∈ O be treated as a discrete random variable with uniform distribution on the set of
binary integers; then as N →∞ the random variable S := logN (β) has expectation value
E(S) =
1
2
(log (N/4) − γ)N , (28)
where γ = 0.577215 . . . is Euler’s constant.
Proof. Define the random variables zj := σj(β) ∈ C, 1 ≤ j ≤ N−12 . Each zj is the sum of N independent
two-valued random variables, for which the Lindeberg criterion [Bi] is easily verified. Thus as N → ∞
each zj = xj + iyj is normally distributed in C with distribution
P(zj)dxj dyj =
4
πN
exp
(−4|zj |2/N) dxj dyj . (29)
The desired expectation value may now be calculated as follows:
E(S) = E
(∑(N−1)/2
j=1 log |zj |2
)
(30)
∼ N
2
∫
log |z|2 P(z) dx dy (N →∞) (31)
=
N
2
∫ ∞
0
log (tN/4) e−t dt , (32)
and the stated result (28) follows.
The norm of a random binary integer is thus smaller by a factor of order exp (−γN/2), relative to the norm
of a Hadamard integer. Below it is speculated that this may account for the fact that the difference map
algorithm typically requires many more iterations for the retrieval of a Hadamard instance. Although the
difference map algorithm is non-algebraic and works with the geometric formulation B′2, the norm is still
relevant because of the fact expressed by the following theorem.
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Theorem 3.5. Let βR be an embedding of β ∈ O in R,
[βR]0 = r (33)
[βR]j = [β]j + r , 1 ≤ j ≤ N − 1 , (34)
where r ∈ R is arbitrary. Then
vol(Tα) = 2
(
8π2
N
)N−1
4 √
N (β) , (35)
where Tα is the torus defined in (16) and specified by α = βRβR.
Proof. Consider a point τ ∈ Tα. From (17) we infer
σ0(τ) = ±|σ0(βR)| (36)
σj(τ) = |σj(βR)| exp iφj = |σj(β)| exp iφj , (37)
where the angles φj for j = 1, . . . , N−12 are arbitrary and related to the others by φj = −φN−j . This shows
that topologically Tα comprises two smooth tori of dimension N−12 . The angles φj serve as convenient
coordinates in the explicit representation for a general point τ ∈ Tα:
τ = ±σ−10 · |σ0(βR)|+ σ−1 · |σ(β)| exp iφ . (38)
The computation of the volume is now an elementary exercise in calculus and leads directly to the quoted
value.
4 Algorithms
Bit retrieval falls within the scope of at least three algorithmic frameworks: (i) algebraic number theory, (ii)
integer programming, and (iii) phase retrieval. We describe below all three as they apply to problem B2, or
its geometrical formulation B′2. Problems B1 and B3 are almost indistinguishable from B2 within the alge-
braic approach, whereas the integer programming and phase retrieval techniques first require geometrical
reformulations of B1 and B3 before these methods can be applied to them.
4.1 Algebraic number theory
In the algebraic approach the secret binary integer (β in problems B2 and B3, β1 or β2 in B1) is first identified
by the principal ideal it generates in O: I = 〈β〉. This task is relatively easy and almost insignificant in
comparison to the subsequent task of finding a binary generator of I . There are algorithms [Co] that take
as input the generators of an ideal I and return a single generator γ if I is found to be principal. This
would appear to be a good technique, since the desired binary generator β can then be expressed in the
form β = uγ, where u is a unit. However, algorithms for principal ideal testing require information about
the class group of O, making this approach prohibitive already for N ≥ 67 [Bu]. An alternative, used
in the algorithm below, is to work only with the lattice structure of I and seek a binary element β′ ∈ I
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without the guarantee that 〈β′〉 = I . Since there are so few binary elements in I , a practical approach is
to enumerate them completely using the Fincke-Pohst algorithm [FP] and thereby discover the particular
element that generates I . The complexity of the algebraic approach is thus determined by the complexity of
an associated lattice search problem.
An example with N = 23 should serve as a substitute for a formal specification of the algorithm. The
identity of the secret binary β is contained in its autocorrelation α = ββ, say
α = −[5, 7, 4, 5, 7, 7, 5, 6, 8, 6, 6, 6, 6, 8, 6, 5, 7, 7, 5, 4, 7, 5] , (39)
or in products γ1 = ββ1, γ2 = ββ2, etc. Suppose we are given just two:
γ1 = [3, 0, 0, 2, 0,−1,−1, 1, 0,−2, 0, 0, 1, 2, 0, 3, 2, 0, 2, 2, 2,−1] , (40)
γ2 = [0, 2, 0,−1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0,−1,−1, 0, 0,−1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0] . (41)
Using efficient algorithms (see [Co]) the ideals generated by α, γ1 and γ2 can be factored into prime ideal
factors with the following result:
〈α〉 = I1I2I3I4 〈γ1〉 = I1I4I5 〈γ2〉 = I1I4I6I7 (42)
I1 = I2 = 〈47, 15 + ζ〉 I3 = I4 = 〈5843, 1833 + ζ〉 (43)
I5 = 〈174157, 61966 + ζ〉 I6 = 〈47, 13 + ζ〉 I7 = 〈1979, 152 + ζ〉 (44)
As an example of an instance of problem B1 we would be given only γ1, say, and the factorization (42)
would provide us with eight candidate factorizations of 〈β〉. This includes the rare possibility that β is a
unit. The number of trial factorizations to explore will almost always be small, and this is especially the case
for the other two bit retrieval problems. In problem B3 we have factorizations for both 〈γ1〉 and 〈γ2〉, giving
only four possible factorizations of 〈β〉. Moreover, the random origins of β1 and β2, say in a digital signature
scheme, would imply 〈β〉 = I1I4 with high probability. Finally, in problem B2 we know that α decomposes
into a complex conjugate pair giving only two possibilities to consider, 〈β〉 = I1I3 and 〈β〉 = I1I4.
For each candidate factorization, the number of which will be small, another standard algorithm [Co] returns
the lattice basis of the corresponding ideal product in Hermite normal form. Given this basis we can in prin-
ciple determine if the lattice contains a nonzero binary vector. From experiments with ideals generated by
random binary elements we find that with high probability the Hermite normal form basis has the following
simple form:
vj := ajζ + ζ
j (1 ≤ j ≤ N − 1) . (45)
This is also the case for the correct factorization choice in our example, 〈β〉 = I1I4, where
a =[274620, 218518, 159293, 98597, 171309, 37690, 214991, 11132, 50442, 252742, 78333,
231057, 55808, 42203, 207268, 79601, 242822, 193340, 248383, 212667, 72735, 58266] .
(46)
We note that a1 + 1 = 274621 = N (β). In general, lattices of high index are unlikely to contain any
nonzero binary vectors, in particular, the secret β. Given a “random” lattice of index N (β) one expects
to find (2N−1 − 1)/N (β) binary vectors, a number which vanishes with N as (Ne−γ/16)−N/2 using the
asymptotic result of theorem 3.4. We may therefore conclude that an exhaustive search for nonzero binary
vectors in the lattice generated by the vj will either yield no results, as in fact happens when the wrong
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algorithm N = 23 29 31 37 41 43 47 53
algebraic number theory (kant4) 0.8 (sec) 9.9 31 3800 62000 * * *
integer programming (bonsaiG) 0.2 (sec) 27 7.2 79 8000 4300 11000 *
phase retrieval (difference map) < 0.1 (sec) < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 0.4 1.1 0.5 2.9
Table 2: Timing results for three bit retrieval algorithms on π-sequence instances
for software running on a single 1.67 GHz Athlon processor (* time limit ex-
ceeded).
factorization 〈β〉 = I1I3 is tried, or will produce just the desired solutions βζ i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N . Any binary
element β′ produced by the search must be tested against the given autocorrelation α since, as an element
β′ ∈ 〈β〉, we only have the guarantee that α divides β′β′. This does not pose a problem in practice since
β′β′ 6= α implies N (β′) ≥ N (β), corresponding to an even smaller expected number of binary vectors
with the incorrect autocorrelation. For the example above, in fact, the search found only the true solution
β = [1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0] (47)
and its 22 multiples with powers of ζ .
For lattice bases of the form (45), the problem of finding a binary vector is closely related to a subset sum
problem. Let A = {a2, a3, . . . aN−1}, then finding a binary vector is equivalent to finding a subset A′ ⊂ A
with sum Σ(A′), such that Σ(A′) ∈ {0, 1} (mod N (β)). Because the subset sum problem is known to
be NP-complete [GJ], this approach to bit retrieval cannot guarantee a polynomial-time solution. However,
by expressing the subset sum problem as a shortest lattice vector problem, Lagarias and Odlyzko [LO]
showed that instances with sufficiently small density d can be solved efficiently using lattice basis reduction
algorithms, where
d :=
|A|
maxa∈A(log2 a)
. (48)
Evaluating this for bit retrieval instances, where |A| = N − 2 and a < N (β) for all a ∈ A, we obtain
d >
N − 2
log2N (β)
N→∞∼ log 4
log (N/4) − γ , (49)
using the result of theorem 3.4. The bound (49) violates the criterion found by Lagarias and Odlyzko,
who showed that d must be no greater than O(1/N) in order for the LLL polynomial-time basis reduction
algorithm [LLL] to succeed in solving the subset sum problem.
The Fincke-Pohst nearest vector algorithm [FP] would appear to be the best technique for finding a binary
vector since it guarantees a solution regardless of density while also taking advantage of LLL basis reduc-
tions. When given the generators vj and target vector [12 , · · · , 12 ], this algorithm returns all binary vectors
in the lattice generated by the vj . Table 2 gives running times for the kant [K] implementation of this
algorithm on bit retrieval instances up to N = 41. All instances were generated by taking the leading N − 1
base 2 digits of π = 11.001 . . . as the components of the secret binary integer β ∈ O in the standard basis.
These same “π-sequence” instances, β = πN , were used to test the other two algorithms discussed below.
The solution given in (47) is π23.
It is probably no coincidence that the long running times for N > 31 coincide with the relatively abrupt
onset of the LLL algorithm’s inability to discover generators for ideals 〈β〉 when given a lattice basis in
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N = 29 31 37 41 43 47 53 59
0.923 0.851 0.504 0.232 0.158 0.070 0.011 0.002
Table 3: Success rate of principal ideal discovery by LLL basis reduction
Hermite normal form. Results for the latter problem are shown in Table 3. In these experiments LLL
reduction was applied to the Hermite normal form basis of the principal ideal generated by a random binary
element β ∈ O. A successful instance of principal ideal discovery was declared if one of the reduced basis
elements v′j satisfied N (v′j) = N (β). From the results in Table 3 we see that the success rate vanishes
rapidly with increasing N , beginning at about N = 31.
4.2 Integer programming
The form of the feasibility problem B′2 that is most amenable to the techniques of integer programming is
that given in theorem 3.1, of finding an element in the intersection B ∩ h(Tα). Although h(Tα) is convex,
standard integer programming algorithms based on linear relaxations also require that this set be defined by
linear inequalities. We therefore make the further relaxation of replacing h(Tα), geometrically a product of
disks, by a product of squares (and one interval):
sh(Tα) :=
{
β ∈ R : |σ0(β)| ≤
√
σ0(α) ,
|ℜ(σj(β))| ≤
√
σj(α) , |ℑ(σj(β))| ≤
√
σj(α) , 1 ≤ j ≤ N − 1
}
.
(50)
Since h(Tα) ⊂ sh(Tα), all bit retrieval solutions are contained in B ∩ sh(Tα). Although we cannot rule
out the possibility B ∩ sh(Tα) 6= B ∩ h(Tα), this is a concern only if the relaxed problem admits too many
additional solutions. Experiments show that in fact this is not the case: only bit retrieval solutions were
found in all the instances studied.
In standard linear programming notation, the feasibility problem for B ∩ sh(Tα) is expressed as:
find: b ∈ {−12 , 12}N
such that: |C · b| ≤ a and |S · b| ≤ a
where: ai =
√
σi(α) Cij = cos (2πij/N) Sij = sin (2πij/N) (0 ≤ i, j ≤ N − 1)
This linear program comprises exactly 2N independent and nontrivial inequalities for N binary variables.
Somewhat unusual is the fact that the coefficient matrices have nearly unit density. Solution times for the
general-purpose solver bonsaiG [Ha] on the π-sequence instances are given in Table 2. Over the limited
range studied, it appears the performance of the integer programming algorithm is somewhat better than that
of the algebraic number theory based algorithm.
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4.3 Phase retrieval
Because the constraints in phase retrieval are typically nonconvex, very different solution strategies have
evolved to solve these problems. Although not true algorithms in a strict sense, with a bounded running time,
these methods are very successful and are not likely to be replaced by more rigorously defined algorithms
in the near future. Here we apply a general purpose phase retrieval method, the difference map [E1], to
problem B′2. The difference map applies to the general feasibility problem of finding an element in A ∩ B,
where A and B are arbitrary sets in a Euclidean space. Practical implementations of the difference map are
limited to situations where the projectors ΠA and ΠB , to respectively the sets A and B, can be computed
efficiently. A brief description of the method is given in the Appendix.
We choose for our two sets the torus Tα and hypercube B (as instances of the general sets A and B of the
Appendix); experimentation indicates there is no advantage in using either of the convex relaxations given
in theorem 3.1. The projectors ΠTα and ΠB are maps R→ R where
ΠTα := σ
−1
0 · Π˜0 · σ0 + σ−1 · Π˜ · σ (51)
is more naturally expressed in terms of the projectors Π˜0 : R → R and Π˜ : CN−1 → CN−1. The projectors
ΠB and Π˜ act componentwise and the action of all three projectors on components ρi, ρ˜0 ∈ R and ρ˜j ∈ C
takes a similar form:
ΠB(ρi) :=
{
1/2(ρi/|ρi|) if ρi 6= 0,
1/2 otherwise. (0 ≤ i ≤ N − 1) (52)
Π˜0(ρ˜0) :=
{ √
σ0(α)(ρ˜0/|ρ˜0|) if ρ˜0 6= 0,√
σ0(α) otherwise.
(53)
Π˜(ρ˜j) :=
{ √
σj(α)(ρ˜j/|ρ˜j |) if ρ˜j 6= 0,√
σj(α) otherwise.
(1 ≤ j ≤ N − 1) (54)
That all three are distance minimizing is immediately clear given the two ways (9, 11) of expressing the
Euclidean norm; the definitions for the exceptional cases (ρi = 0, etc.) are arbitrary but apply to sets of
measure zero and therefore never arise in actual computations.
The difference map with parameter β = 0.7 (see Appendix) found solutions for bit retrieval instances
significantly faster than either of the other algorithms (Table 2). Figure 1 shows results for the π-sequence
instances in the range 29 ≤ N ≤ 109 and the significantly more difficult Hadamard sequences for N =
31, 43, 47 and 59. Several runs were performed for each instance in order to reliably obtain the mean number
of iterations I0 required by the algorithm to find the solution. From the overall linear variation of log2 (I0)
with N of the π-sequence instances, one obtains the estimate 2cN for the average-case complexity, with
c ≈ 0.22. The complexity is dominated by the exponential number of iterations performed, since the time
required per iteration grows only as O(N logN) (from FFT computations). The Hadamard sequences were
selected for study because they saturate the norm bound (theorem 3.3). For these instances the complexity
of the algorithm follows a distinctly steeper exponential growth, with c ≈ 0.69.
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Figure 1: Complexity of the difference map algorithm for two sets of bit retrieval
instances. Plotted vertically is log2 (I0), where I0 is the mean number of iterations
performed by the algorithm. Instances fall in the range 29 ≤ N ≤ 109 (horizon-
tal axis) and include π-sequences (solid circles) and Hadamard sequences (open
circles).
5 Public key signature
The economy of hiding binary sequences within their autocorrelation almost rivals that of the RSA scheme
of hiding a pair of large primes within their product [RSA]. As for the task of retrieving binary sequences
from their autocorrelation, the survey of algorithms in the previous section lends some evidence to the
possibility that bit retrieval may be even harder than factoring large integers. These two considerations
combined, economy and intractability, provide motivation to design cryptographic systems based on the
one-way nature of the autocorrelation operation. Below we propose a digital signature where private and
public keys are related by this one-way function. In its broadest description this scheme belongs to the class
of cryptographic systems based on lattices (see [MG]), a notable example being the NTRU system [NTRU]
whose lattices, as here, are ideals of the ring Z . The characteristic of the new scheme that represents a
departure from other lattice-based systems, including NTRU, is the simplicity of the relationship between
private and public keys. In that the latter can be viewed as the product in an algebraic number field, the RSA
relationship between private and public keys provides a natural point of comparison. On the other hand,
by using the degree of the number field (N − 1) as the security parameter, and in particular not having the
benefit of a Euclidean division algorithm, the new scheme enters largely unexplored territory.
A brief description of the scheme developed below begins with Alice, who wishes to apply her signature
to a piece of data. We consider two closely related situations: (1) Alice signs a general digital document
by attaching her signature, and (2) Alice signs data that may even be analog in nature by modifying it
irreversibly. The term watermark will be used when referring to case (2). In both cases the input to the
signing operation is an element ρ ∈ R. The watermarking situation is the most straightforward, where ρ is
simply a set of N samples of say an audio signal or grayscale image. We assume the individual samples
are measured to sufficient resolution such that when rescaled to unit resolution the corresponding elements
ρ ∈ Z have a large range, say 0 < [ρ]i < M with M = 28, for example. In the more general situation (1),
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we assume that the element ρ ∈ Z is the output of a public message digest (one-way hash function), applied
to the digital document.
Alice’s private key is a secret binary integer β ∈ O that defines a map Sβ : R → Z which sends the input
ρ to an element ρβ ∈ Z with the property Ψ(ρβ) ∈ β O. In essence, the signing operation corresponds
to quantization of the “cyclotomic content” of ρ on a secret principal ideal. A key property of the signing
map is the guarantee ‖ρ − ρβ‖ < ∆, where ∆ is a parameter. In the watermarking scenario this is clearly
important if the signed data is to serve as a substitute for the original. More significantly, particularly when
signing a message digest for which fidelity is not an issue, the smallness of ∆ provides security against
forgeries.
By signing the data Alice hopes to be able to assert her authorship when challenged, for example, by Bob.
Moreover, Bob may independently have an interest in establishing the authenticity of data attributed to Alice.
Both needs are met if Alice publishes the autocorrelation of her private key, α = ββ. To verify authorship or
authenticity, Bob must check two things. First, he computes the autocorrelation of the data in O, Ψ(ρβρβ),
and checks for divisibility by Alice’s public key α. If α does not divide Ψ(ρβρβ), then Bob concludes the
data is not quantized on Alice’s secret ideal β O. Second, in the message digest scenario, Bob applies the
public hash function to the document to obtain ρ and checks that ‖ρ− ρβ‖ < ∆. If the inequality is violated
Bob concludes that the signature was forged. In the watermarking scenario, where Bob does not have access
to the original ρ, the violation of this inequality manifests itself in a signal, image, etc. that is so distorted to
be immediately suspect.
The security of this scheme rests on two assumptions: (1) extracting Alice’s private key from her public key,
or bit retrieval, is computationally infeasible, and (2) without access to Alice’s private key it is infeasible to
compute good quantizers for her secret ideal. Attacks which test these assumptions will be refereed to as
“direct” and “counterfeiting”, respectively.
5.1 Key generation
From the empirical complexity estimate 2cN , c ≈ 0.22, for the fastest known algorithm, it appears that bit
retrieval becomes effectively infeasible for relatively modest values of N , say N > 250. Once N is fixed,
the success of bit retrieval by the difference map can be further diminished by increasing the norm of the
private key β, as implied by the observed correlation between the latter and the average number of iterations
performed by the algorithm (Fig. 1). Since the norm can be calculated efficiently, a practical method for
optimizing the key is to simply generate a large number of binary integers using a pseudo-random number
generator and select the one with the largest norm.
5.2 Signing
The process of signing an element ρ ∈ R (data, message digest) is accomplished by the map Sβ : R → Z
defined by
Sβ(ρ) := ⌈σ−1 · σ (Qβ(ρ)) + π0(ρ)⌋ , (55)
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where Qβ : R→ β O is the quantizing map that requires the private key β, and ⌈ ⌋ rounds each component
in the standard basis to the nearest integer. Since Qβ(ρ) ∈ O, we have σ−1 · σ (Qβ(ρ)) = α + qΦN for
some α ∈ Z and q ∈ Q. Moreover, since π0(ρ) = rΦN for some r ∈ R, all components acted upon by the
rounding operation have the same fractional part and we have
Sβ(ρ) = σ
−1 · σ (Qβ(ρ)) + π0(ρ) + ǫΦN , (56)
where |ǫ| < 12 . From (56) we infer that Ψ(Sβ(ρ)) = Qβ(ρ) and π0(Sβ(ρ) − ρ) = ǫΦN , showing that Sβ
preserves the cyclotomic “codeword” Qβ(ρ) and the embedding in Z achieves the minimum distance when
projected onto the ideal RΦN .
The quantizing map Qβ seeks to find the element of the ideal β O that minimizes the Euclidean distance to
ρ in the orthogonal complement of RΦN , the space R⊥ ∼= R/〈ΦN 〉. Since this closest vector problem is
hard for the arbitrary ideals (lattices) specified by β, we use an approximate but computationally efficient
form for Qβ . For arbitrary ρ ∈ R, define
Qβ(ρ) := β QO
(
σ−1 · (σ(ρ)/σ(β))) , (57)
where the division sign denotes componentwise division and QO is the quantizer R⊥ → O for the norm
(12). For β 6= 0 this map is well defined since the complex numbers σj(β) will all be nonzero.
The problem of computing QO(γ) for γ ∈ R⊥ is equivalent to vector quantization for the dual of the root
lattice AN−1 and is treated by Conway and Sloane [CS]. In the following we describe the algorithm given
by Scheidler and Williams [SW] in the context of Euclidean division algorithms for cyclotomic fields. We
first obtain ⌊γ⌋ ∈ Z by taking the floor of each component in the standard basis. The fractional parts
of the components are then sorted to obtain a permutation {p0 . . . pN−1} of {0 . . . N − 1} such that if
γ − ⌊γ⌋ = ∑N−1i=0 ǫi xpi , then ǫ0 ≤ ǫ1 · · · ≤ ǫN−1. Using this permutation we recursively generate the
sequence γ0 . . . γN−1, where γ0 = ⌊γ⌋ and γi+1 = γi + xpi . The quantizer is then given by QO(γ) =
Ψ(γi), where i identifies the element of the sequence that minimizes ‖γ − γi‖⊥. From the geometry of the
fundamental domain D ⊂ R⊥ of O (see [CS], [L]) one obtains the following bound on the quantization
error:
‖γ −QO(γ)‖⊥ ≤ N
2 − 1
12N
. (58)
The mean-squared quantization error ∆O is defined as the expectation value of ‖γ − QO(γ)‖⊥ when γ
is uniformly distributed over a region in R⊥ that is large enough that edge effects can be neglected, or
equivalently, where γ is uniformly distributed over D. A formula for ∆O, useful for small N , is given in
[CS].
When N is large a good alternative to the quantizer QO is the simpler map QZ : γ 7→ Ψ(⌈γ⌋). For uniformly
distributed data one can show [E2] that the improvement in the quantization error, of QO over QZ , is almost
always negligible as N → ∞, a fact that also implies the asymptotic limit ∆O ∼ N12 . The approximate
quantizer QZ can be computed somewhat faster than QO.
A quantitative measure of the fidelity of the signed data is the evaluation of the mean-squared quantization
error ∆β of the map Sβ:
Theorem 5.1. For the signing map specified by (55) and uniformly distributed data ρ ∈ R,
∆β := E (‖Sβ(ρ)− ρ‖) (59)
= N
(
∆O
N − 1 ‖β‖⊥ +
1
12
)
(60)
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Proof. The calculation combines the two forms of quantization error already discussed. The arguments
leading to (56) show that the real number ǫ defined by
Sβ(ρ)− ρ = σ−1 · (σ(Qβ(ρ)− σ(ρ)) + ǫΦN (61)
is uniformly distributed in the interval (−12 , 12) when ρ is uniformly distributed in R. For quantization in
R⊥ by QO we have the statement that δ ∈ R⊥ defined in
Qβ(ρ) = β
(
σ−1 · (σ(ρ)/σ(β)) + δ) (62)
is uniformly distributed in the fundamental region D of O. Moreover, the distributions of ǫ and δ are clearly
independent. From (62) we have
σ(Qβ) = σ(ρ) + σ(β)σ(δ) , (63)
with the result that (61) may be rewritten as
Sβ(ρ)− ρ = σ−1 · (σ(β)σ(δ)) + ǫΦN . (64)
Taking the norm of (64) we have
‖Sβ(ρ)− ρ‖ = ‖σ−1 · (σ(β)σ(δ))‖⊥ + ǫ2N (65)
=
1
N
(σ(β)σ(δ)) · (σ(β)σ(δ)) + ǫ2N . (66)
What remains is taking the expectation values E(ǫ2) = 112 and for 1 ≤ j ≤ N − 1,
E (σj(δ)σj(δ)) =
1
N − 1 E (σ(δ) · σ(δ)) (67)
=
N
N − 1 E(‖δ‖⊥) (68)
=
N
N − 1 ∆O , (69)
since the left side of (67) is clearly independent of j. After applying these averages to (66) we obtain the
result (60) for the mean-squared quantization error:
∆β =
1
N
N−1∑
j=1
σj(β)σj(β) E (σj(δ)σj(δ)) + E(ǫ
2)N (70)
=
∆O
N − 1
N−1∑
j=1
σj(β)σj(β) +
N
12
. (71)
The most direct way of assessing the fidelity of a watermark is by comparing the root-mean-squared quan-
tization error per component for uniformly distributed data,
δrms :=
√
∆β
N
, (72)
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with the range of values in the data. We are primarily interested in δrms when β is a random binary key and
N is large. If βR is the corresponding binary key in R, then ‖β‖⊥ = ‖βR‖ − σ0(βR)2/N ∼ N/4, since
σ0(βR) = O(
√
N). Combining this with (60) and ∆O ∼ N12 , we obtain
δrms ∼
√
N
48
(N →∞) . (73)
In the image watermarking application of section 7, for example, the elements of data are blocks of N = 379
pixels, and the range of each component (pixel) is an 8-bit integer. Signing an image with the map Sβ thus
modifies each pixel (±) by δrms ≈ 2.8, or about 1% of its range.
Associated with the application of a watermark is a loss of information that can be used as a means of
normalization when comparing with other schemes. The map Sβ is an example of a lattice quantizer, for
which the lost information content corresponds to the volume V of the region inR that maps to any particular
“codeword” in Z . Since this region comprises the product of a unit interval in RΦN with a fundamental
region of β O in R⊥, we have V = N (β). The standard normalization applied to the root-mean-square
quantization error per component is the following [CS]:
G :=
δ2rms
V 2/N
(74)
∼ e
γ
12
≈ 0.148423 . . . (N →∞) , (75)
where (75) was obtained using (73) and (28) for random binary keys β. When the input to the signing
operation is already a digital document, this value can be compared with Wong’s watermarking scheme
[W]. In Wong’s scheme the least significant bit of each element of a block of data is replaced by the output
of a one-way hash function applied to the block. The parameters for Wong’s watermark are thus δrms = 12 ,
V = 2N , giving the slightly better value G = 18 . On the other hand, for analog data Wong’s watermark can
only be applied after a digital encoding step has made its own contribution to the net quantization error. For
large N , Zador’s analysis of random quantizers [Za] gives the bound G > 1/(2πe).
A noteworthy property of the signing operation, as well as the verification step (below), is that it can be
efficiently implemented without the need for arbitrary precision arithmetic: a finite precision general purpose
FFT can perform all the necessary ring multiplications and divisions in a time that grows as N logN .
Assuming that the Fourier transform coefficients of the key, σ(β), are computed only once during the signing
of many data items, a total of four FFTs are performed in the computation of Sβ(ρ) for each ρ. Since all
the other parts of the computation (quantizing with QZ , etc.) only involve O(N) arithmetic operations, the
overall complexity of signing is nearly linear in the size of the data, O(N logN). Verification is the stronger
test of the finite precision arithmetic in that autocorrelations are involved. Tests with 12-bit data showed that
standard double precision arithmetic was adequate for N < 1000.
5.3 Verification
To verify that a digital document has been signed by Alice, Bob makes use of four things: the message
digest ρ ∈ R resulting from the application of a public one-way hash function to the document, Alice’s
signed modification ρβ = Sβ(ρ) ∈ Z , Alice’s public key α ∈ Oˆ, and the fidelity parameter ∆. He first
applies the verification map Vα : Z → R⊥
Vα(ρβ) := σ
−1 · (σ(ρβρβ)/σ(α)) , (76)
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and checks whether Vα(ρβ) ∈ O. Recall that if ρβ is quantized with Alice’s private key β, then σ(ρβ) =
σ(βγ) for some γ ∈ O. Since α = ββ, Bob computes
Vα(ρβ) = σ
−1 · (σ(βγβγ)/σ(ββ)) = σ−1 · σ(γγ) (77)
and concludes that Vα(ρβ) ∈ O. When unsuccessful, Vα(ρβ) is a non-integer in the cyclotomic field Q[ζ],
that is, not all components in the standard basis will be integers.
A fast, finite precision arithmetic implementation of this first part of the verification requires two FFTs, not
counting σ(α), which is computed once in the course of verifying a large stream of data. With the first
FFT Bob computes σ(ρβ); he then squares the modulus, divides by σ(α), and applies the inverse FFT to
the result. To check for membership in O, he obtains the fractional parts of the components in the standard
basis and compares these with zero, making allowance for the finite precision in the calculation.
To complete the verification Bob checks that ‖ρ − ρβ‖ < ∆. The parameter ∆ is chosen to guard against
forgeries. As discussed below, there is a significant gap between the range of distances ‖ρ − ρβ‖ realized
by Alice’s quantizers ρβ and quantizers that can be computed by a forger. This gap grows with N so that ∆
need not be specified precisely when N is large. In watermarking applications the last step of the verification
cannot be performed because the original ρ is not available. Instead, the poorness of the forger’s quantizers
have the effect of introducing so much noise to the signal or image that the authenticity of the signature is
immediately called into question (see section 7).
6 Security
Eve has at least two ways of undermining this signature scheme: she can attempt to determine Alice’s
private key β from the publicly available data, or she can sign data with a substitute for Alice’s key and hope
that nobody notices. It appears that both forms of attack, respectively direct and counterfeiting, become
prohibitively difficult for reasonable values of N .
6.1 Direct attack
Since Eve has access to Alice’s public key α = ββ, as well as multiple signed data elements, ρ1 = βγ1,
ρ2 = βγ2, . . ., it is fortunate (for Alice) that Euclidean algorithms cease to exist beyond N = 19 [MM] that
Eve might use to extract the common divisor β. An alternative approach for solving these instances of prob-
lems B2 and B3 is to use the algorithms of algebraic number theory, as illustrated in section 4.1. However,
neither this approach nor the integer programming method for solving B′2 was found to be competitive with
the phase retrieval algorithm. The time complexity of the latter was investigated in section 4.3 and appears
to be exponential in N . A direct attack is thus infeasible with the currently known algorithms.
6.2 Counterfeiting
Since the verification challenge for this signature scheme tests for membership in the ideal β O, and the
inclusion βγ O ⊂ β O holds for arbitrary γ ∈ O, data signed with any nonzero multiple of Alice’s private
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key, say β′ = βγ, will also satisfy the challenge. Such counterfeit keys are publicly available, from Alice’s
public key α = ββ, to the numerous elements of data Alice herself has signed: ρ1 = βγ1, ρ2 = βγ2, . . . .
What makes these options for counterfeiting Alice’s signature generally unacceptable to Eve is that the
corresponding quantization errors will be large. The derivation of the root-mean-squared quantization error
per component (72) is valid for arbitrary keys β′ (not necessarily binary) and can be approximated for large
N by
δrms ∼
√
‖β′‖⊥
12
. (78)
Now if β′ = β is a genuine (binary) private key, then the expectation value
E(‖β‖⊥) ∼ N
4
, (79)
assuming a uniform distribution on the binary keys, gives the estimate δrms ∼
√
N/48 obtained previously
in (73). If instead β′ = βγ, then
E(‖βγ‖⊥) ∼ N
4
‖γ‖⊥ , (80)
where the expectation value is again computed (details omitted) with respect to the uniform distribution on
binary β. The counterfeit key thus increases δrms by a factor of order
√‖γ‖⊥. If instead Eve chooses to
sign with Alice’s public key, β′ = ββ, then the expectation value (over uniformly distributed binary β)
E(‖ββ‖⊥) ∼ N
2
8
(81)
shows that δrms would increase by
√
N/2 over its value when signing with the private key.
The discussion above suggests making a minor modification to the quantization map (57) that ensures the
outcomes Qβ(ρ⊥) = βγ have factors γ with some minimum Euclidean norm that grows with N . It was
already argued that fidelity is not significantly sacrificed when the quantizer QO is replaced by QZ , and in
fact this can be generalized to include the quantizer [E2]
QZ˜ : ρ⊥ 7→ Ψ(⌈ρ⊥ + rΦN⌋) (82)
for arbitrary r ∈ R. The choice r = 12 has a clear advantage when signing a block of data ρ where
the components are nearly equal, as in watermarking parts of an image with small contrast. The input
ρ⊥ = σ
−1 · σ (σ(ρ)/σ(β)) to Q
Z˜
is then a random vector with small components distributed around zero,
for which Q
Z˜
with r = 12 produces a random binary integer as output. Quantizing with QZ˜ will thus almost
always produce factors γ with ‖γ‖⊥ > N/4. In the rare event that this is not true, the signer (Alice) can
artificially amplify the contrast (by rescaling ρ⊥) until this condition is met.
Eve is also severely limited in how much she can reduce her quantization error through the use of a better
quantization algorithm. Since the dimensionless mean-squared quantization error is always greater than
Zador’s bound G > 1/(2πe) [Za], and Alice’s quantizer Sβ has G = eγ/12, Eve can at most hope to reduce
δrms by the constant factor
√
6/(πe1+γ ) ≈ 0.628.
Eve can mount a different counterfeiting attack by attempting to solve problem B3. Suppose γ1 and γ2 are
two random elements of O, say with bounded components. For large N it will almost always be true that
γ1O + γ2O = O. Since Eve has access to several products βγ1, βγ2, . . . (signed data and public key), she
can in principle construct the ideal generated by Alice’s private key from the fact βγ1O + βγ2O = β O.
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In computational terms this corresponds to taking the union of the lattice generators of the two ideals and
applying some form of lattice basis reduction in order to be able to recognize β. For counterfeiting purposes,
however, Eve does not have to succeed in finding β: rather, she will be satisfied with any element of β O
having a small Euclidean norm. Since this is exactly the kind of problem for which LLL basis reduction has
proven to be effective, the following experiment was performed.
For eachN in the experiment, twenty “LLL attacks” were performed. The data for each attack was generated
from three random binary integers: β (the private key), β1 and β2. Available to Eve are the pair, ρ1 = ββ1
and ρ2 = ββ2, representing two signed elements of data with small Euclidean norm, say, or one data item
and the public key. The lattice basis Γ for ρ1O + ρ2O was constructed from Γ1 and Γ2, where
Γk = {Nσ−1 · σ(ρkζ i) : 1 ≤ i ≤ N − 1} (k = 1, 2) . (83)
The scaling factor N produces an integral basis Γ for a lattice in R⊥ to which basis reduction can be applied.
From the construction of Γ it will almost always be true that there exists a reduced basis Γ′ where all the
generators are binary vectors (βζ i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N−1) multiplied byN . The minimum Euclidean norm achieved
for this reduction (after division by the scaling factor N ) is therefore ‖β‖⊥ ∼ N/4. Computing Γ′ from Γ is
difficult, and we limit ourself to the reduced basis ΓLLL obtained by the LLL algorithm [LLL]. If the basis
element of minimal norm, γmin ∈ ΓLLL, has an acceptably small norm, Eve can use it as a counterfeit key.
As a figure of merit, the output of the experiment was the smallest value of the ratio r = ‖γmin‖⊥/(N/4)
achieved for all twenty attacks. Values r ≈ 1 indicate a successful attack, that is, where data signed with
γmin would not be noticeably more distorted than data signed with Alice’s private key. Unsuccessful attacks
have r > 1 , where larger values result in signed data that is more easily recognized as bearing a counterfeit
signature.
Figure 2 shows a plot of r for the range 23 ≤ N ≤ 97. For N < 50 the LLL attack is successful,
providing Eve with a key in a reasonable time with which she can sign data that would be verified as Alice’s.
Beyond N ≈ 50 the ratio r achieved by the LLL attack increases sharply to values where the computed
key is not useable. Interestingly, for N ≥ 89 it appears that LLL basis reduction is even counterproductive,
the resulting γmin having a norm that exceeds the norms ‖ρ1‖⊥ ≈ ‖ρ2‖⊥ ∼ (N/4)2 of the starting basis
elements (shown as the line with slope 1/4 in Fig. 2).
7 Image watermarking
The signature scheme proposed in the previous section, when applied to image watermarking, illustrates
the role of noise in the detection of forgeries. We recall that increasing the value of the security parameter
N serves two purposes: (1) the corresponding bit retrieval problem, of extracting the private key from the
public key or signed data elements, becomes harder, and (2) the quality of quantization with counterfeit keys
becomes increasingly poor. Here we focus entirely on the second point.
The creation of forgeries in the present context is known in the watermarking literature as a vector quan-
tization attack [HM]. Wong [W] introduced the watermarking scheme where Alice modifies each block of
pixels in their least significant bits by the output of a message digest applied to the block. The forger, Eve,
is then limited to building her images out of exact copies of blocks that have already appeared in images
signed by Alice. The set of available image quantizers — blocks bearing a valid signature — in the present
scheme is considerably larger, being any elements of the lattice specified by Alice’s private key.
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Figure 2: Failure of LLL basis reduction to find a suitable counterfeit key when
N (horizontal axis) is large. Each data point represents the smallest norm basis
element γmin found by the LLL algorithm out of twenty trials. The vertical axis is
the ratio r = ‖γmin‖⊥/(N/4), or the excess norm over the reduction corresponding
to the discovery of the private key.
There are numerous practical issues that our discussion omits, such as the method of partitioning the image
into data blocks [Ce]. We are only interested in watermarks that are both invisible and fragile. The latter
term refers to the property that changes in the value of even one pixel will cause a failure in the verification
and facilitate the localization of tampering.
Figure 3 shows the result of applying a digital signature, of the type described in section 5, to a 361 × 420
pixel grayscale image. The pixels of the image were first partitioned into 19× 20 rectangular blocks, where
the dimensions were chosen so that the total number of pixels per block is one greater than a prime, in this
case N = 379. The extra pixel was left unchanged by the signing operation. To ensure that the final signed
image has 8-bit integer pixels, a global scaling and shift was applied to all the pixel values of the original.
Since signing typically modifies a component by ±δrms ≈ 2.8 (for N = 379), the parameters of the scaling
and shift were adjusted to bring the pixel values of the original into the range 5− 250. Frames (a) and (b) of
Figure 3 are TIFF images using, respectively, the original and signed pixels as raster data. The two images
are practically indistinguishable, with differences (c) discernible only at artificially high magnification.
An attempted forgery is shown in (d), where quantization was not performed with Alice’s short binary key β,
but a much longer counterfeit key βγ. The latter key was taken from Alice’s signed image (b), specifically
from the pixel block with smallest Euclidean norm. Blocks with small Euclidean norm arise in those parts
of an image where the contrast is small. Recognizing this, image (b) was signed using the quantizer Q
Z˜
(and r = 12 ) which avoids multipliers γ with small norms. In (b) the smallest norm among the 399 blocks,
‖βγ‖⊥ ≈ 4697, was considerably larger than that of the private key, ‖β‖⊥ ≈ 95. The poor quality of the
resulting forgery is the result of two mechanisms. First, the amplitude of the noise introduced by signing,
or δrms, is increased by the factor
√‖βγ‖⊥/‖β‖⊥ ≈ 7. Second, the increased value of δrms requires that
the range in the pixel values of the original must first be compressed (by rescaling) in order that the signed
values fall in the range 0 – 255. The second mechanism has the effect of reducing the signal to noise ratio
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Figure 3: Image watermarking application of the digital signature. (a) TIFF image
of a paper watermark by Pietro Miliani Fabriano. (b) Modification of (a), signed
with a binary key. (c) Details of original (left) and signed (right) images. (d) Noisy
image produced by signing (a) with a counterfeit key.
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of the signed image to practically zero when the counterfeit key βγ has a sufficiently large norm.
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9 Appendix: the difference map
LetA andB be subsets of anN -dimensional Euclidean spaceE. For the application discussed in section 4.3,
E is the ring R. The specification of the sets A and B is computationally easy, while the task of comput-
ing the intersection A ∩ B is assumed to be difficult. The difference map is defined in terms of projectors
ΠA and ΠB , which map an arbitrary x ∈ E to points in A and B that minimize the Euclidean distances,
‖ΠA(x)−x‖ and ‖ΠB(x)−x‖. Practical algorithms require that both projectors can be computed efficiently
for any x ∈ E.
We are interested in solving
find: x ∈ A ∩B , (84)
or equivalently,
find: x ∈ E such that x = ΠA(x) = ΠB(x) . (85)
The difference map D : E → E, defined by [E1]
D(x) := x+ β(ΠBfA −ΠAfB)(x) , (86)
is constructed such that its fixed points are simply related to the solutions of (85). Here β 6= 0 is a real
parameter and the maps fA, fB : E → E are defined in terms of the basic projectors by
fA := (1 + γA)ΠA − γA (87)
fB := (1 + γB)ΠB − γB , (88)
where γA and γB are two additional real parameters. At a fixed point of D, x∗ = D(x∗), we have
ΠBfA(x
∗) = ΠAfB(x
∗) := xsol , (89)
and xsol evidently solves (85) since
ΠA(xsol) = ΠAΠAfB(x
∗) = ΠAfB(x
∗) = xsol , (90)
and similarly when acted upon by ΠB . In general xsol 6= x∗, and the set of fixed points associated with xsol,
(ΠAfB)
−1(xsol) ∩ (ΠBfA)−1(xsol) , (91)
is normally a continuum. The set of fixed points is not empty if a solution xsol exists, since xsol is itself a
fixed point.
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The parameters γA and γB are chosen to make the fixed points of D attractive. Satisfying this criterion
for arbitrary sets A and B and optimizing convergence is in general difficult [E2]. Here we consider two
particularly simple examples of the local behavior. First, if the sets A and B are manifolds we can approx-
imate them by affine spaces in the neighborhood of a solution. After translating this solution to the origin,
we make the further assumption that the corresponding linear spaces are orthogonal so that the projectors
satisfy ΠAΠB = 0. The difference map then simplifies to
D(x) = x− βγAΠB(x) + βγB ΠA(x) . (92)
Optimal convergence to the fixed points of D (the linear space ker ΠA ∩ kerΠB) is obtained when
γA = −γB = 1/β , (93)
although this assumes both A and B have positive dimension. If either space is a point, then ΠA = 0 or
ΠB = 0 and, respectively, the optimal γB or γA remains undetermined. Since this is the case for the set B
in bit retrieval (hypercube), our second example examines this situation. For simplicity we take N = 1 and
sets A = Z and B = {0}. The corresponding difference map is given by
D(x) = x+ β⌈γBx⌋ , (94)
where ⌈ ⌋ denotes rounding to the nearest integer. The set of fixed points is the interval (−(2γB)−1, (2γB)−1),
where the (trivial) local behavior of D is independent of γB as already mentioned. However, on a global
scale we see that convergence requires that β and γB have opposite signs. In fact, optimal convergence is
obtained precisely when γB = −1/β, in agreement with (93). In the absence of a more comprehensive
analysis we will adopt the parameter values (93) suggested by these two examples.
A special case of the difference map first appeared in the context of image reconstruction from Fourier mod-
ulus data and an object support constraint. Motivated by ideas from linear control theory, Fienup considered
three feedback variants in an iterative scheme, the most successful of which became known as the hybrid
input-output algorithm [F]. In image reconstruction applications of the difference map, A corresponds to the
torus of Fourier modulus constraints, as in bit retrieval, while B is a linear space representing the support of
the object in the image. Fienup’s formulation made no reference to projectors but coincides exactly with the
difference map for the parameter values γA = 1/β, γB = −1, and β > 0 [E1]. The geometrical represen-
tation and generalization of the hybrid input-output iteration, made possible by projectors, was recognized
only recently [BCL, E1].
When applied to bit retrieval and phase retrieval with atomicity constraints, it is believed [E1] that the
dynamics of the difference map is chaotic and strongly mixing. If true, this implies that the starting point
of the iterations is largely irrelevant: an initial distribution of starting points very quickly approaches an
invariant distribution. This property can be strictly true only in the case of ill-posed instances, when there is
no solution. Solutions represent an exceptional situation, a constellation of fixed points “hidden” within the
invariant distribution that the chaotic dynamics is attempting to discover. The strongly mixing hypothesis
implies that every iteration is effectively subject to a fixed probability of being within the basin of attraction
of a fixed point, after which it quickly converges to an entirely different invariant distribution: the fixed
point. Thus the number of iterations I of the method is expected to have the probability distribution
dP (I) = exp (−I/I0) (dI/I0) , (95)
where I0 is the mean number. The method is optimized by minimizing I0 with respect to the parameter β for
appropriate test problems. Figure 4 compares the histogram of the number of iterations required to solve the
bit retrieval instance for the sequence π41 with the distribution (95). The data shown represent 104 solution
attempts, all successful and differing only in the choice of initial (random) iterate.
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Figure 4: Comparison of the distribution of difference map iterations I , required
to solve the bit retrieval instance π41, with the exponential distribution predicted
by the strongly mixing hypothesis. The units on the abscissa give the ratio I/I0,
where I0 ≈ 9623 is the mean number of iterations.
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